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A WOLF IN WOLF'S CLOTHING-OTHER INCIDENT




T1HERE IS NOTHING stealth or secret about the devastating
effect of "other incident" evidence.' It is the most danger-
ous evidence a jury will hear.2 It has been called a "tactical nu-
clear weapon, ' "the most powerful weapon in the plaintiff
attorney's arsenal, 4 and "vital 5 to persuading ajury that a prod-
uct is defective. It can change the verdict calculus and lay the
foundation for a punitive damages award.
* Jonathan R. Friedman is a Partner in the Tort Defense Group of McKenna
Long & Aldridge, LLP. He works principally in the areas of insurance, product
liability, and complex tort litigation, with an emphasis on defending
manufacturers, service providers, and other businesses in the aviation, industrial
machinery, and transportation markets. He is the Editor of The Georgia Aviation
Flyer, the aviation law reporter for the Aviation Law Section of the State Bar of
Georgia.
** Matthew S. Knoop is an Associate in the Tort Defense Group of McKenna
Long & Aldridge, LLP. His practice focuses on the defense of companies in
aviation, automobile, and other product-related catastrophic injury cases.
I Robert A. Sachs, "Other Accident" Evidence in Product Liability Actions: Highly
Probative or an Accident Waiting to Happen?, 49 OKI-A. L. REv. 257, 257-58 (1996)
(stating that other incident evidence "has the potential to affect significantly the
outcome of the case").
2 See, e.g., Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434,
1440 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that "the occurrence of similar accidents
or failures involving the same product has great impact on a jury").
3 Michael Hoenig, Products Liability: Evidence of Other Accidents-Part I1, 218 N.Y.L.
J. 3, 3 (1997).
4 Tab Turner, Proving Design Defects With Other Similar Incidents Evidence, TRIAL,
Mar. 1999, at 42.
5 Francis H. Hare, Jr., Admissibility of Evidence Concerning Other Similar Incidents
in a Defective Design Product Case: Courts Should Determine "Similarity" by Reference to
the Defect Involved, 21 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 491, 494, 504, 522 (1998) (stating that
other incident evidence "is arguably the single most important category of evi-
dence available to the plaintiff in a defective design product case," "the strongest
evidence the plaintiff can adduce," and is often "vital" to the plaintiffs case).
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Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards6 is illustrative of the power of
"other incident" evidence. There, a Florida district court al-
lowed the plaintiff, Hall-Edwards, to introduce "widespread" evi-
dence of other accidents to bolster her claim that the design of a
1996 Ford Explorer was defective.7 Hall-Edward's son, a passen-
ger in the Explorer, died after the driver of the Explorer fell
asleep at the wheel and lost control.' At trial, the jury heard
testimony on numerous other accidents, including "comment to
the effect that Ford caused 'hundreds' of injuries and deaths in
other rollover accidents involving the Ford Explorer."' After
hearing this and other evidence, the jury returned a run-away
verdict of $60 million against Ford. 10 On November 7, 2007, the
appellate court reversed the verdict in Hall-Edwards, finding that
evidence of other accidents had become an improper "feature
of the case," that the evidence was admitted without the neces-
sary legal foundation, and that the trial court had failed to take
the proper precautions when admitting the evidence. 1
This survey article examines the proper foundational require-
ments for, and the use of, other accidents involving other prod-
uct failures ("other incidents") in aviation litigation. Part I
reviews the discovery of this evidence, while Part II discusses the
admissibility of other incident evidence at trial and catalogs the
purposes for which it may be admitted. Part III examines key
evidentiary considerations.
PART I: THE DISCOVERY OF OTHER
INCIDENT EVIDENCE
The scope of discovery, while broad, is not unlimited. 12
"[D]iscovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and
necessary boundaries."' 3 Courts rightfully refuse to compel re-
sponses to document requests and interrogatories when the pro-
pounding party has asked for irrelevant materials and
information, failed to limit the discovery sought to an appropri-
6 971 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
7 Id. at 859.
8 Id. at 856.
9 Id.
10 Id.
1" Id. at 856, 860.
12 Axson v. Nat'l Surety Corp., 327 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. 1985).
13 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
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ate temporal period, or made overly broad and unduly burden-
some requests. 4
Filtering out irrelevant and overly broad discovery ensures
that the "discovery process [does not] acquire wings and fly into
remote and unconnected areas."' 5 While courts allow the dis-
covery of material and information that may not be admissible
at trial,' 6 they restrict discovery, when justice demands, to pre-
vent fishing expeditions.' 7
In the context of other incident evidence, the touchstone of
relevance is "substantial similarity."' 8 "Without a showing of sub-
stantial similarity, the evidence is irrelevant as a matter of law."' 9
Although the standard is given a more rigorous application at
trial, many courts tend to relax the test during discovery because
of the perceived complexity of aircraft engineering, the expen-
sive nature of aviation litigation, and the felt inequality resulting
from certain aviation defendants' exclusive access to all or most
of the technical data.z0 Either way, the object of other incident
14 See, e.g., Rose v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 495 S.E.2d 77, 82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(limiting scope of relevance to "the existence of the defect in goods produced at
the same plant at around the same time"); West v. Nodvin, 397 S.E.2d 567, 570
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Teklewold v. Taylor, 610 S.E.2d
617, 619 n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) ("[N]o court should impose upon the opposite
party the onerous task of producing great quantities of records which have no
relevancy.").
15 Frey v. Chrysler Corp., 41 F.R.D. 174, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1966); accord
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 (11th Cir. 1997).
16 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
17 Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992); Piacenti v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 173 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
18 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Webster v. Boyett, 469 S.E.2d 459, 462, 464
(Ga. 1998). See also In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994,
172 F.R.D. 295, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1997) for a good discussion of the discovery of
other incident evidence.
19 Moseley, 447 S.E.2d at 306.
20 See, e.g., Kramer v. Boeing Co., 126 F.R.D. 690, 693 (D. Minn. 1989) (ex-
plaining that aircraft engineering is "highly technical and sophisticated" and
"[o]versimplification of the limits of discovery in highly technical products liabil-
ity matters is quite sure to deprive plaintiffs of necessary avenues of proof");
Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (stating
that the complex and expensive nature of aviation litigation required liberal in-
terpretation of rules relating to production of documents); cf Melvin v. United
States, 14 Cl. Ct. 236, 238 (1988) (Without discovery of two F-16 Avionic Systems
Manuals, plaintiff was "stymied from adequately supporting his claim because de-
fendant control[led] exclusively the access to technical data that would assist
plaintiff.").
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discovery "must have some evidentiary value."'" Or, stated an-
other way, "[slome threshold showing of relevance must be
made before parties are required to open wide the doors of dis-
covery and to produce a variety of information which does not
reasonably bear upon the issues in the case. 2 2
In most jurisdictions, the discovery of other incidents, includ-
ing the discovery of information and materials relating to other
products or predecessor models of a product, may be allowed if
the other accidents and/or products are highly similar or "suffi-
ciently similar" to the accident and/or accident-causing prod-
uct.23 In Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,24 for example, the court
permitted discovery of three model years preceding the model
at issue, but denied discovery as to a still earlier model, finding
that it was too dissimilar.25 The party propounding the discov-
ery bears the burden of proof on the issue of similarity,26 and
courts carefully evaluate the proof offered to determine the sim-
ilarities and dissimilarities. 27 "Conclusory statements of alleged
similarity are not enough.128
Piacenti v. Gen. Motors Corp.29 is illustrative. There, the driver
of a 1991 Geo Tracker brought product liability claims against
General Motors Corporation ("GM") and Suzuki Motor Com-
pany, the manufacturers of the Tracker."° At least one set of the
plaintiffs discovery sought test results and other information
about the Suzuki Samurai, a different model sport utility vehi-
cle." After GM and Suzuki objected to the discovery, the plain-
tiff moved to compel.3 2
The court initially denied the motion but invited the plaintiff
to re-file her motion with an expert opinion verifying that the
Tracker and Samurai were "sufficiently similar. '33 The plaintiff
later renewed the motion, submitting the affidavits of two ex-
21 Piacenti, 173 F.R.D. at 223.
22 Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380.
23 Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
24 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958).
25 Id. at 608.
26 See, e.g., Barcenas v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 03-04644RMWE, 2004 WL
2827249, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2004); Fine, 133 F.R.D. at 442.
27 Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380-81.
28 Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
29 173 F.R.D. 221 (N.D. Ill. 1997).






perts, both of whom asserted that the test results and other in-
formation about the Samurai were relevant to proving the
Tracker's alleged defects. 4 The experts merely alleged, how-
ever, "in conclusory fashion," that the discovery was needed be-
cause the vehicles shared many of the same characteristics. 3 5 In
response, GM and Suzuki "refute [d]" the conclusory allegations
by producing the declaration of an expert "familiar with the de-
sign" of both vehicles. 6 In his declaration, the expert specified,
in detail, numerous differences in the design, manufacture, con-
figuration, and production timeline for the Tracker and the
Samurai."
Criticizing the plaintiffs arguments and lack of substantiating
facts, the court denied her motion to compel, holding that the
discovery was not relevant because the Tracker and Samurai had
different suspension systems, different engines, different centers
of gravity, different wheelbases, different tracks, different
lengths, and different widths.3 These differences made "com-
parison between the two [vehicles] equivalent to comparing ap-
ples and oranges. ' 39 The court explained that "[t] he legal tenet
that relevancy in the discovery context is broader than in the
context of admissibility should not be misapplied so as to allow
fishing expeditions in discovery. '"40
It is clear from Piacenti and other decisions that the burden of
proof requires a specific factual showing of similarity, but the
showing does not necessarily rise and fall on the support of com-
petent expert testimony.4' Rather, courts "look to the state of
the record as a whole," analyzing the documentary evidence for
common product history and shared component characteristics,
together with the affidavits adduced on the subject.4 2 Courts
view this evidence against the claims alleged in the litigation. 3
For the discovery to be allowed, the other products must share
with the accident-causing product those characteristics relevant
-14 Id. at 223.
35 Id. at 225.
36 Id. at 223, 225.
37 Id. at 223.
- Id. at 225.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 224.
41 See, e.g., Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (N.D. Ga.
2007) ("What is required is a specific factual showing of substantial similarity.").
42 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295,
305 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
43 Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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to the legal issues in the case.4 4 The products must share "perti-
nent" characteristics relevant to the accident.45
In Fine v. Facet Aerospace Products Co., 46 a personal injury action
filed after a Cessna 150F "plunged to earth," Fine, the plaintiff,
alleged "that the crash was caused by the presence of water in
the aircraft's [metal] fuel [system] .' Fine sued the manufac-
turer, Cessna Aircraft Company, on theories of negligence and
strict liability. 48 In discovery, Fine sought production of Cessna
memoranda addressing the history of the problem of water in
two different fuel systems-rubber bladder fuel tanks and wet-
wing fuel systems.49 Cessna opposed the discovery, and Fine
moved to compel. 5° The court denied the motion, finding that
the record contained no evidence and that Fine had made no
showing that bladder tanks and wet-wing fuel systems were simi-
lar to, or potential substitutes for, metal tanks in the 150F.5'
At the other end of the proof spectrum is In re Aircrash Disaster
Near Roselawn, Ind. Oct. 31, 1994.52 In that case, sixty-eight peo-
ple died when an ATR-72 aircraft crashed near Roselawn, Indi-
ana.53 The NTSB found that the probable cause of the crash
was "the loss of control, attributed to a sudden and unexpected
aileron hinge moment reversal. '5 4 In discovery, the plaintiffs
sought production of materials and information about the ATR-
42.55 This model aircraft was relevant, the plaintiffs claimed, be-
cause the ATR-72 was "nothing more than a 'stretch version' of
the ATR-42. ''56 The defendants opposed the discovery and mo-
tions practice ensued.57 In support of their motion, the plain-
tiffs did not produce an expert affidavit attesting to any
similarities; rather, they attached numerous exhibits showing
significant similarities in the design, performance, and operat-
ing experience of the ATR-42 and ATR-72 aircraft, including evi-
44 Id.
45 Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1992).
46 133 F.R.D. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
47 Id. at 440.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 441.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 443.
52 172 F.R.D. 295 (N.D. I11. 1997).
53 Id. at 295, 298.
54 Id. at 298.
55 Id. at 297.
56 Id.
57 Id at 297-98.
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dence of numerous shared components, the single type
certificate shared between the planes, the NTSB factual report
finding five ATR-42 incidents relevant to the agency's determi-
nation of probable cause and, among other items, an FAA bulle-
tin relating to both aircraft, which was issued after the crash.58
In response, the defendants steadfastly argued that the ATR-42
was not "even marginally relevant" and produced a declaration
attesting to the lack of similarities between the aircraft. 9
Relying on their defense expert's declaration, the defendants
in Roselawn urged the court to deny the plaintiffs' discovery mo-
tion because they had failed to substantiate their position with
expert testimony and, thus, the defendants claimed, the defense
declaration "trump[ed]" any allegation of similarity.6" The
court rejected this argument, finding that the declaration was
"unworthy," that it was "at odds" with other sworn statements
previously made by the declarant, and that the "record as a
whole" was "replete with reliable evidence showing substantial
similarities" between the aircraft.6" Accordingly, the court or-
dered full and complete discovery of the ATR-42.62
PART II: THE ADMISSIBILITY AND USE OF
OTHER INCIDENT EVIDENCE
Although there is no mechanical test applicable to every case
in every jurisdiction, other incident evidence is not admissible at
trial without a prior showing of substantial similarity.63 The doc-
trine rests on the concern that dissimilar accidents lack the req-
uisite relevance,64 and recognizes the inherent prejudice that
58 Id. at 298-306.
59 Id. at 302-03.
60 Id. at 303, 305.
61 Id. at 304-06.
62 Id. at 311.
63 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
("Without a showing of substantial similarity, the evidence is irrelevant as a mat-
ter of law."), abrogated in part on other grounds by Webster v. Boyett, 469 S.E.2d 459,
462, 464 (Ga. 1998).
64 Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991).
Two exceptions are noteworthy. First, courts are split as to whether evidence of
dissimilar incidents is admissible for purposes of impeachment. CompareWheeler
v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1409 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the evidence
inadmissible), with Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928, 934-35
(8th Cir. 1987) (allowing the evidence), and Cooper, 945 F.2d at 1105 (admitting
the evidence). Second, the doctrine of substantial similarity does not apply to
evidence of dissimilar products involved in similar accidents if offered to illus-
trate the physical principles behind the accident. See, e.g., Heath v. Suzuki Motor
2008] 447
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results, or can result, from the admission of "similar act"-type
evidence."5 For example, "the jury might infer from evidence of
the prior accident alone that ultra-hazardous conditions existed
... and were the cause of the later accident without those issues
ever having been proved."66
To limit the prejudice that inures to a party from the admis-
sion of past occurrences or accidents involving other products,
nearly every jurisdiction has developed some version of the sub-
stantial similarity test.6 7 Federal courts apply the federal doc-
trine, while state courts apply state law.68 In general, the
doctrine teaches that where evidence of other accidents involv-
ing a product is concerned, the party seeking to introduce that
evidence must first show that the other accidents occurred
under "substantially similar circumstances" and involved "sub-
stantially similar" products.6 9 Typically, the doctrine operates to
protect the defendant at trial, but it may be used to safeguard a
plaintiff where the defendant seeks to offer an out-of-court sim-
ulation of actual events,7 0 proffers statistical evidence purport-
ing to show comparative product safety, 71 or introduces
evidence of a plaintiffs past mishaps to bolster the defense of
contributory negligence.72
Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396-97 (11th Cir. 1997) (admitting evidence of dissimilar
rollovers to "explain how rollovers occur"); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
847 F.2d 1261, 1278 (7th Cir. 1988) (admitting evidence of videotape of test
flight even though aircraft was dissimilar because tape was offered to explain cer-
tain in-flight physical principles).
65 Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
66 Gardner v. Southern Ry. Sys., 675 F.2d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1982).
67 In fact, the authors have not found a jurisdiction that does not apply the
doctrine.
68 The admissibility of evidence is a distinctly procedural matter. Heath, 126
F.3d at 1396 (holding that in the Eleventh Circuit, the admission of other inci-
dents is generally governed by the federal substantial similarity doctrine, not state
law).
69 Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 369, 390 (D. Minn. 1987).
70 Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1442
(10th Cir. 1992) (excluding defendant's out-of-court experiment and stating that
"[e]xperiments purporting to simulate actual events may be admissible if made
under conditions which are substantially similar to those which are the subject of
the litigation").
71 Jaramillo v. Ford Motor Co., 116 Fed. Appx. 76, 78-79 (9th Cir. 2004).
72 Heath, 126 F.3d at 1396 n.11.
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The proponent of this evidence carries the burden of proof,7"
and the evidence's admissibility turns on the theory of the case,
the sufficiency of the evidence, and the purpose for which it is
offered:
The [proponent] bears the burden of establishing sufficient simi-
larity between the prior incidents and his own theory of how the
accident occurred, so that admitting the prior evidence "will
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more probable" than it would be with-
out the evidence. 4
The court's inquiry necessarily begins with the proponent's
theory of the case (e.g., theory of defect) since "the definition of
the defect itself will influence the resolution of substantial simi-
larity. '7 5 The proponent, however, "cannot define a ...defect
so broadly that all products .. .are by definition 'substantially
similar.' ,,76 Common sense requires some scrutiny by the court
or "almost all prior occurrence evidence would be admissible in
products liability cases. 7 7
To satisfy the court that the other incidents are "sufficiently"
substantially similar, the proponent must establish that the
other incidents share a common design, common defect, and
common causation with the subject accident and accident-caus-
ing product.7 8 In Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,79 the court
affirmed the exclusion of a prior air-crash because "too few estab-
lished facts" supported a determination that the prior incident
and the subject crash were substantially similar.8 0 In general,
73 Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Civ. Nos. 02-4185-KES, 03-501 1-KES, 03-5063-
KES, 2006 'WL 3042793, at *11 (D.S.D. Oct. 24, 2006) (Order Regarding Motions
In Limine).
74 Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. C1V. A. 94-CV-1818, 1998 WL
744087, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 1998) (quoting FED. R. EviD. 401).
75 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 634 (Pa. Com. P1.
1984); accord In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, Nos.
MDL-817, 89 C 8082, 1991 WL 279005, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1991) ("The focus
of an inquiry into the substantial similarity of a prior accident to the accident at
issue is a function of the theory of the case advanced by the proponent of the
prior accident evidence.").
76 Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 890 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
77 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 543 S.E.2d 21, 24 (Ga. 2001).
78 Id. at 23.
79 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
80 Id. at 1269. Of primary concern to the appellate court was that the plaintiff
had failed to present any evidence that the alleged defect in the subject air-
crash-a frozen elevator-was involved in the prior incident. Id.; see a/soJulander
v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 846-47 (10th Cir. 1973) (finding the required
2008] 449
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"while the relevant factors in each case will change, changes in
place, remoteness of time, changes in circumstances, and/or
changes in the product or area itself are the factors most fre-
quently considered in deciding whether other incidents are
'substantially similar.'
Knowing the law of the jurisdiction in which the case is pend-
ing is key since the proof requirement changes from court to
court. For example, some courts require a showing of causa-
tion,2 while others do not. Some courts screen for temporal
proximity (excluding the prior incidents they deem "too remote
in time"), 3 while others do not.84
The degree of exactness and the level of scrutiny applied by
the court also vary by jurisdiction. Some courts set the same
hurdle for all prior incidents, 5 while others apply a continuum
such that the degree of similarity needed to satisfy the doctrine
turns on the purpose for which the other incident evidence is
offered. s6 Likewise, what is an approved purpose in one jurisdic-
tion may find rejection in another. For example, federal courts
admit other incident evidence to prove myriad purposes, includ-
ing direct proof of negligence, 7 propriety of punitive dam-
level of substantial similarity "singularly lacking" despite the proponent's proffer
of other incidents involving the same product with the same alleged defect).
81 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 632 (Pa. Com. P1.
1984).
82 Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) ("The
showing of substantial similarity must include a showing of similarity as to causa-
tion."); see also Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 935
(10th Cir. 1984) (affirming the exclusion of other air crashes because a "similar-
ity of proof of causation was lacking").
83 Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards, 971 So. 2d 854, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (identifying temporal proximity as one element of the Florida test); see In
re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, Nos. MDL-817, 89 C
8082, 1991 WL 279005, at *6 (N.D. Il. Dec. 26, 1991) (excluding two prior inci-
dents because, among other reasons, they occurred more than fifteen years
before the air crash at issue).
84 See, e.g., Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Mo.
2000) ("A prior accident that meets the requirements of similarity, even though
remote, may be highly material. Remoteness of time goes to weight of the evi-
dence in most circumstances, not to its admissibility.").
85 See, e.g., Moseley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d 302, 307 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994), abrogated on other grounds by Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998);
Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 552 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
86 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 1991 WL 279005, at *6 (re-
laxing the test when other incident evidence is offered for certain purposes);
accord Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1442
(10th Cir. 1992).
87 Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ages, s 8 as well as notice, magnitude of the danger involved,
defect, the ability to correct a known defect, the lack of safety
for intended uses, strength of the product, the standard of care
and causation, 9 and to refute a defense.' Courts in Louisiana,
on the other hand, only admit other incidents "for the limited
purpose" of showing notice of defects or dangerous
conditions.9 1
The more common purposes are discussed below.
A. CAUSATION
When other incident evidence is offered to prove causation,
courts typically require a "high" or heightened degree of similar-
ity.9 2 "The rationale . . . is simple. In such cases, the jury is
invited to infer from the presence of other accidents (1) that a
dangerous condition existed (2) which caused the accident. 93
In other words, the jury is asked to infer liability from evidence
of the prior accident alone without the issue of liability having
been proved in the pending litigation.9 4 For admission of other
incidents to prove causation, the proponent of the evidence
must show: "(1) a similar product; (2) a similar defect; (3) cau-
sation related to the defect in other accidents; and (4) exclusion
of all reasonable secondary explanations as to the cause of th[e]
crash."9
This high hurdle has led one Pennsylvania court to conclude:
It is possible, in theory, to prove causation of one accident
through evidence of other accidents. However, we have found
no Pennsylvania authority for this proposition.
88 John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir.
1977); Bemer Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 290, 302
(E.D. Penn. 1985); see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639-40
(Ga. 1993).
89 Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 661 (11th Cir. 1988) (identifying
notice, magnitude of the danger involved, defect, the ability to correct a known
defect, the lack of safety for intended uses, strength of the product, the standard
of care, and causation as acceptable purposes).
90 Four Corners Helicopters, 979 F.2d at 1439.
91 Bertrand v. Air Logistics, Inc., 820 So. 2d 1228, 1238 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
92 Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2000);
Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988).
93 Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1268-69.
94 Id.
95 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 630-31 (Pa. Com.
P1. 1984); see also Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 552 (E.D.N.C.
1995).
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... [W]e agree .. .that [the] use of other accidents to prove
causation is purely a theoretical basis for admitting other acci-
dent evidence.96
For example, Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp. involved the
crash of a Beech Baron 58P.97 At trial, the plaintiff alleged that
the airplane's design rendered it unsafe for flight because it per-
mitted ice to accumulate on the horizontal stabilizer, thereby
freezing the elevator.9" The federal appellate court affirmed the
exclusion of a prior air-crash of the same model because the
cause of the prior crash had never been determined. °" "Our
primary concern is that the plaintiffs have not presented any evi-
dence that the alleged dangerous condition-a frozen eleva-
tor-was in any way involved in the [prior] accident."'0 0
The court thus concluded that admission of the prior acci-
dent would have led the jury to infer that the prior crash was
caused by the same factors as the crash at issue."° ' The defen-
dant would then have had to unfairly litigate, as a practical mat-
ter, both accidents.10 2
B. DEFECT OR DANGEROUS CONDITION
As with the issue of causation, evidence offered to illustrate
the existence of a defect or dangerous condition necessitates a
high degree of similarity because "it weighs directly on the ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the jury."' 3 In Four Corners Helicop-
ters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., the plaintiffs filed suit against the
manufacturer of the turbine engine in an Aerospatiale SA 315 B
"Lama" helicopter. 04 The case arose from the crash of the
Lama and the death of its pilot.10 5 At trial, the plaintiffs alleged
that the crash was the result of engine failure which was caused
"when a loose labyrinth housing screw backed out of position
and contacted the rear face of the compressor impeller. '"106
96 Christ, 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 629-30.
97 Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1264.
98 Id.
9q Id. at 1266-69.
100 Id. at 1269.
101 Id.
102 Id.
M-3 Four Corner Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440
(10th Cir. 1992).
104 Id. at 1435.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1436.
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The plaintiffs introduced, and the court admitted, evidence of
sixteen prior reports of loose labyrinth screws.'° 7 The prior inci-
dents were offered to show a design defect, negligence, and
among other things, causation.' ° After hearing this and other
evidence, the jury returned a verdict against the engine manu-
facturer for $1,266,130.' 9 On appeal, the manufacturer argued
that the other incidents were not substantially similar to the sub-
ject crash because, among other reasons, none of the other inci-
dents involved an in-flight engine failure; none of the other
incidents involved accidents, but instead concerned mechanical
problems identified on the ground; and, in some of the reports
the compressor impeller was made of aluminum, a softer mate-
rial than the titanium used on other impellers."0 The appellate
court disagreed, affirming the admission of all sixteen prior inci-
dents.'' After reiterating the black letter rule that evidence
proffered to illustrate the existence of a defect or dangerous
condition necessitates a high degree of similarity, the court,
without critical analysis, held that "[t]he incidents, though not
identical, were substantially similar and were therefore admissi-
ble to indicate the existence of a defect" and "for all purposes
offered by the plaintiffs."' 12
C. NOTICE
To be admissible on the theory of notice, the other incidents
must have alerted the party against whom they are offered of the
problem or danger at issue. "If there is no dispute as to the
existence of a hazard or danger, there is no reason for ajury to
hear about other accidents to 'prove' knowledge of that hazard
or danger, and such evidence is irrelevant."' 3 When consider-
ing which other incidents to admit for purposes of notice, courts
typically look at whether the other incidents preceded the acci-
dent at issue,"'4 and whether "sufficient time" has elapsed "so as
107 Id. at 1439.
108 Id.
09 Id. at 1437.
110 Id. at 1440.
In Id.
112 Id.
113 Sachs, supra note 1, at 279.
114 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 628 (Pa. Com. P1.
1984) ("Obviously, in order to prove a defendant's notice of a defect, the other
accidents must occur prior to the accident in question in order to be
admissible.").
2008] 453
454 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to raise the question of constructive notice."' 1 5 Prior incidents
that are too remote in time may risk exclusion,' 16 while subse-
quent accidents, in most cases, are not admissible.117 Courts
routinely limit the type and extent of the "notice" evidence ad-
mitted since the issue is notice itself, not notice of the details.' 8
Finally, some jurisdictions relax the similarity test when other
incidents are offered to show notice," 9 while others do not.120
Georgia, for example, has specifically rejected any suggestion of
a reduced burden. In Moseley v. General Motors Corp.,12 1 the Geor-
gia Court of Appeals posed this rhetorical question: "If the rela-
tive defects are not similar, how can one be notice of the
other?' ' 22 But not all courts share this sentiment. In In re Air
Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, a federal court
115 Id. at 633.
116 Compare In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, Nos.
MDL-817, 89 C 8082, 1991 WL 279005, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1991) (holding
that accidents occurring fifteen and seventeen years before the subject accident
were too remote in time), with Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d
151, 159 (Mo. 2000) ("A prior accident that meets the requirements of similarity,
even though remote, may be highly material. Remoteness of time goes to the
weight of the evidence in most circumstances, not to its admissibility.").
117 CompareJulander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839, 846 (10th Cir. 1973)
(holding evidence of subsequent incident inadmissible to show notice of defect),
with Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630, 640 n.13 (Cal. 1984) (admit-
ting twenty other incidents for notice despite that seven occurred after the sub-
ject accident; the court held that the introduction of these later-occurring
accidents was not overly prejudicial in light of the number of other incidents
already admitted).
11s Wilson v. Bradlees of New Eng., Inc., No. Civ. 93-47-JD, 1999 WL 816817, at
*6 (D.N.H. Feb. 3, 1999) (holding that "plaintiffs will not be permitted to intro-
duce any evidence of the specific details of other accidents, injuries, causes, com-
plaints, or cases to show notice").
119 Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1440
(10th Cir. 1992); Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 n.9
(7th Cir. 1988); accord, McLeod v. Era Aviation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-294, 1996 WL
109302, at *2-*3 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 1996) (requiring the proponent to show
"reasonable similarity" when other incidents are proposed to show notice); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 1991 WL 279005, at *2 (noting a "relaxed" similar-
ity requirement for other incidents introduced to prove notice); Elsworth, 691
P.2d at 639 (holding that "all that is required ... is that the previous injury
should be such as to attract the defendant's attention to the dangerous
situation").
120 Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); accord
Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 552 (E.D.N.C. 1995) ("Evi-
dence of other accidents is highly prejudicial.").
121 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Webster v.
Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998).
122 Id. at 307.
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in Illinois relaxed the similarity test to admit a prior accident
involving a different type of aircraft produced by a different
manufacturer with a different, allegedly defective hydraulic sys-
tem. 123 That case arose from the crash of United Airlines Flight
232 following a total loss of the hydraulic powered flight con-
trols in a McDonnell Douglas DC-10.124 Prior to trial, McDon-
nell Douglas moved in limine to exclude evidence of the 1985
crash of a Japan Airlines Boeing 747.125 The differences in the
two planes were substantial, including the design and configura-
tion of the engines and their hydraulic systems. 126 Despite these
and other differences, the court in Sioux City held that the other
incident was relevant to show "McDonnell Douglas' knowledge
of available measures taken by an industry competitor to correct
a potentially serious problem that in theory might strike its own
aircraft [and] is therefore central to the question of its liability
for the Sioux City accident."'' 27
The court stated that the differences between the two acci-
dents "lay outside the substantial similarity determination" and
that the different triggering events that caused the total loss of
hydraulic power went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
evidence. 128
D. PROPRIETY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Evidence of other incidents may establish or bolster a claim
for punitive damages because prior incidents arguably show that
the defendant was on notice of a defect and failed to cure it.' 29
This type of "conscious indifference to consequences" is the
touchstone of the punitive damages standard. In Mack Trucks,
Inc. v. Conkle,130 the plaintiff, the driver of a Mack tractor trailer
truck, alleged that he was injured when the truck overturned
due to a fatigue crack in the truck's right frame rail.' At trial,
the driver offered, and the court admitted, evidence that Mack
123 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 1991 WL 279005, at *9.
124 Id. at *1.
125 Id.
126 Id. at *2-'4.
127 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Bemer Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 290,
299 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (affirming the award of punitive damages because Hughes
Helicopter conducted a "woefully insufficient investigation" in the face of over
fifty similar incidents).
130 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
131 Id. at 636.
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Trucks "had received numerous complaints about cracks in the
frame rails" of other similar Mack trailer trucks.' 32 After consid-
ering this and other evidence, "[t] he jury returned a verdict for
compensatory damages in the amount of $184,082, and an
award of punitive damages . . . in the amount of $2 million. 133
The appellate court affirmed the admission of the other inci-
dent evidence, holding that the prior incidents were substan-
tially similar to the subject accident and that the record was
"replete with evidence showing that, for four years prior to the
incident," the marketing division of Mack Trucks ignored or re-
jected internal recommendations to "reinforce the frames . . . at
a cost of $103. ''134 "We conclude that this evidence, along with
other evidence in the record, shows a 'conscious indifference to
consequences,"' and therefore meets the punitive standard in
Georgia. 35
E. REFUTING A DEFENSE
Other incident evidence may be used to refute a defense that
the accident was caused by a maintenance problem,136 or,
among other things, that the alleged defect could have not ex-
isted in the product. 137
For example, in Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged improper manufacture of the spur adapter gearshaft
("SAG") in the Allison engine of a Bell helicopter. 13 At trial,
the plaintiffs offered evidence of SAG failures in two prior inci-
dents to refute the engine manufacturer's suggestion that the
SAG at issue "could not have been defective because it was man-
ufactured according to specifications." '139 The plaintiffs offered
to withdraw the evidence if the manufacturer would stipulate
that parts can fail despite meeting specifications, but the manu-
facturer refused. 4 The trial court admitted the prior incidents,
even though the other incidents resulted from severe wear
rather than a metallurgical defect. 4'
132 Id. at 639-40.
133 Id. at 636-37.
134 Id. at 640.
135 Id.
136 See Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1439
(10th Cir. 1992).
'37 SeeJoy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
13- Id. at 553.
139 Id. at 554-55.
140 Id. at 555.
14' Id. at 554.
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After finding that the "issue is close," the appellate court af-
firmed the admission of the other incidents because the other
SAGs "broke in precisely the same location" as the SAG in the
subject helicopter and "all three failures occurred well before
the end of the estimated useful life of the SAGs involved."'142
"Notably, we have not required that accidents occur in precisely
the same manner" to qualify under the doctrine.1 43
PART III: KEY EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS
A court "has broad discretion to determine the relevance of
proffered evidence,"' 144 and evidentiary rulings ordinarily are de-
ferred until the time of trial. 145 In the context of other incident
evidence, the court "must satisfy itself that the rule of substantial
similarity has been met."'146 This typically requires a hearing or
"mini-trial" outside the presence of the jury so that the court
may critically assess the foundation for, and relevance of, other
incident evidence, including any prejudice that would result
from the admission thereof.147
When arguing for or opposing the admission of other inci-
dent evidence, the following considerations are key.
A. PREJUDICE
Even when the proponent carries his burden outside the pres-
ence of the jury, the admissibility of other incident evidence lies
within the sound discretion of the trial judge, "who must weigh
the dangers of unfairness, confusion, and undue expenditure of
time . . . against the factors favoring admissibility."'4 8
"[A]dmission of other incidents is tempered by judicial concern
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, Nos. MDL-817,
89 C 8082, 1991 WL 279005, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1991).
'45 Id.; see Bemer Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 290,
301 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (declining to rule "abstractly" on a motion in limine to ex-
clude evidence of other incidents).
146 Colp v. Ford Motor Co., 630 S.E.2d 886, 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
147 See, e.g., Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988)
(stating that the preferable method of determining "substantial similarity" is
through a hearing out of the presence of ajury at trial); Olson v. Ford Motor Co.,
410 F. Supp. 2d 855, 868 (D.N.D. 2006) (requiring the plaintiff to identify other
incidents in advance of a hearing that "will then be held outside the presence of the
jury at which time the plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence to be offered
is relevant, substantially similar, and admissible under Rule 403").
148 Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1988).
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that the evidence may raise collateral issues which confuse both
the real issue and the jury."' 49
In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation," ° the court
affirmed the exclusion of other flight incidents because they
would require "a mini-trial within a trial, resulting in undue de-
lay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."'15
Similarly, in Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,'55 a federal court in
Pennsylvania heard a full day of testimony and argument regard-
ing the admissibility of certain evidence showing that undrain-
able water in the fuel system of other Cessna 140 aircraft
allegedly caused nine other accidents. 153 Recognizing the inher-
ent complexity of the presentation of this evidence at trial, the
court stated:
[Admission of this evidence at trial] would have necessitated at
least nine mini-trials on the issue of whether each accident was
caused by undrainable water in the fuel system, as opposed to
causes due to weather, pilot error, flight conditions, whether
there were improper maintenance and pre-flight examinations,
other suspected mechanical failures, or a host of similar factors
concerning the other accidents. These mini-trials would have
taken weeks to complete. The jury would have .. .been sub-
jected to at least two adverse expert opinions for each of the
mini-trials, that would in turn have to be measured against many
fact witnesses offered in each of those mini-trials. 154
The court then refused to reconsider its prior evidentiary rul-
ing excluding this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
403.155
B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
Customer complaints, lawsuits, and other out-of-court docu-
ments that allege or summarize other incidents are generally
not admissible when offered to prove the truth of the matter
149 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 619 (Pa. Com. P1.
1989) (internal quotations omitted).
150 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
'51 Id. at 935.
152 Cir. A. No. 93-6948, 1996 WL 37823 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1996).
153 Id. at *5.




asserted. 56  In Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong,57 the court
observed:
Complaint letters in a manufacturer's files may be true, but
they also may be accusatory and selfserving; they are rarely under
oath and never subject to cross-examination. As they are necessa-
rily out-of-court statements, they are hearsay if offered to prove
the truth of the assertions therein-that the incidents com-
plained of occurred as reported.
58
In Olson v. Ford Motor Co.,159 a federal court in North Dakota
excluded numerous customer complaints that the plaintiff in-
tended to offer "to show brake ineffectiveness, relative danger-
ousness of condition, negligence, and defective condition"
because, in each instance, the plaintiff was relying on the truth
of the underlying assertion (that is, that the brakes failed and
the driver was placed in harm's way).1 60 The court did admit
several of the complaints, however, to show notice of the allega-
tions after satisfying itself that the underlying facts were substan-
tially similar to the accident at issue.1 6 ' But the court held that
the "specific details" of each customer complaint could not be
introduced and gave the jury "a limiting instruction to the effect
that such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of estab-
lishing Ford's notice and cannot be used as evidence of a defect
or for any other purpose." 162
In Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,' 63 the court took a slightly dif-
ferent approach. There, the plaintiffs sought to introduce five
Service Difficulty Reports ("SDRs") discussing alleged wastegate
elbow malfunctions in certain Cessna aircraft.'64 Prior to trial,
the court overruled Cessna's hearsay objections, holding that
156 See Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1273-74 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that a service bulletin warning foresters not to fly airplanes into
known icing conditions was properly excluded because plaintiff was unable to
provide information about the author of the bulletin, such as his qualifications,
source of knowledge, and accuracy of information); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that thirty accident
reports submitted to NTSB were properly excluded on the issue of defective de-
sign because the reports were hearsay).
157 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004).
158 Id. at 139-40.
159 410 F. Supp. 2d 855 (D.N.D. 2006).
16 Id. at 861.
161 Id. at 862-64.
162 Id. at 864.
163 Civ. Nos. 02-4185-KES, 03-5011-KES, 03-5063-KES, 2006 WL 3042793
(D.S.D. Oct. 24, 2006).
164 Id. at *10.
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"[t]he veracity of the underlying complaints has no effect on
Cessna's notice, and thus, the SDRs are not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."' 65 Finding that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish substantial similarity "from the short factual
summaries contained within the SDRs," the court nonetheless
decided that the plaintiffs "should have the opportunity" to lay
the proper foundation at trial.' 66
C. WITNESSES
Although the testimony of injured plaintiffs in other cases or
the testimony of eyewitnesses from other crashes is very power-
ful evidence, courts often exclude this type of testimony from
trial.' 67 More commonly, the proponent relies on expert
testimony.
While an expert may rely upon evidence not otherwise admis-
sible to form his opinion,'68 he may not act as a mere conduit
for inadmissible facts, nor should he be able to off-load prior
accidents as the basis for his opinions if those accidents were
independently excluded by the court.'69 In Nachtsheim v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 7 ' the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ex-
clusion of evidence of a prior air-crash. 7 The plaintiffs then
attempted to introduce the excluded evidence through the testi-
mony of an expert witness who had relied on the prior crash in
forming an opinion about the causes of the air-crash at issue.172
The trial court permitted the expert to state his opinions based
165 Id. at *11.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., Olson, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (excluding witnesses from other acci-
dents). But see Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1271 (7th Cir.
1988) (affirming the plaintiffs reading in to the record the deposition testimony
of another pilot who had allegedly experienced the same problem as had plain-
tiffs in the present litigation).
168 See FED. R. EviD. 703.
169 In reAir Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, Nos. MDL-817,
89 C 8082, 1991 WL 279005, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1991). But see Lawhon v.
Ayres Corp., 992 S.W.2d 162, 165-66 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (permitting expert to
relay to the jury otherwise hearsay information concerning other incidents of
structural wing failure because "an expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier
of fact the factual basis for his opinion because the opinion would otherwise be
left unsupported, and the trier of fact would be left with little if any means of
evaluating its correctness;" and also finding a lack of prejudice, as such evidence
was cumulative of the expert's testimony).
170 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
171 Id. at 1269-70.
172 Jd. at 1270.
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on the excluded evidence but disallowed testimony in which the
expert spoke directly of the excluded prior crash evidence. 73
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding
that expert testimony may be based on inadmissible materials
but that does not mean that information independently ex-
cluded by reason of another rule of evidence (e.g., Federal Rule
of Evidence 403) will automatically be admitted under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703.174
D. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The admission of other incidents at trial raises a number of
concerns for the party against whom the evidence is offered.
The first is how best to minimize the effect of this evidence.
While the party has the choice of cross-examining the propo-
nent's witnesses to emphasize a prior incident's dissimilarities,1
7 5
such is often "no choice at all: either not cross-examine so as to
minimize the impact of th[e] evidence; or cross-examine and
risk confusing the jury and further prejudice their case." 171 The
same is true of limiting instructions. Some instructions do more
harm than good. For example, in Soden v. Freightliner Corp.,'77
the court allowed the plaintiff to introduce numerous lawsuits
and informal complaints as evidence of other incidents during
the cross-examination of the defendant's expert. 178 Immedi-
ately after this testimony, the court gave a repetitive eight-sen-
tence, 300-word limiting instruction that did nothing but
reemphasize the other incidents and their notice to Freightliner
of alleged design problems with the subject product. 79
Second, as demonstrated in Soden, courts also allow the pro-
ponent to impeach the other party's witnesses using other inci-
dent evidence, demonstrating the need to carefully plan direct
testimony. For example, if a defendant asserts that the accident
simply could not have occurred as the plaintiff alleged, other
173 Id. at 1270-71.
174 Id.; see In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, 1991 WL 279005, at *8 ("Rule 703
should not be regarded as a general exception to otherwise applicable eviden-
tiary limitations.").
175 See Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A., 979 F.2d 1434, 1439
(10th Cir. 1992).
176 Christ v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 636 (Pa. Com. P1.
1984) (holding that "the fact that it may not have been possible to minimize the
impact of [the other incident] evidence was no reason to exclude it").
177 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983).
178 Id. at 507.
179 Id.
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incidents become relevant and should be admitted to impeach
the witness or rebut a defense. 8 ' For the same reason, litigants
should be wary of "opening the door" to the admission of other
incident evidence. For example, in Bemer Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes
Helicopter, Inc.,1' a federal trial court upheld its earlier decision
to admit evidence of other incidents after the defendant opened
the door by cross-examining the plaintiff's expert as to thirty-six
service reports of mechanical problems encountered by other
operators of Hughes helicopters.18" "Defense counsel made a
strategic decision to explore the substance of the [reports].
Once the defendant examined the witness on each [report], he
opened the door for the plaintiff to pursue the [reports] on
redirect. 183
Finally, the party against whom the other incident evidence is
offered at trial must make timely and appropriate objections
when the evidence falls outside the proponent's original proffer
of substantial similarity, particularly with regard to expert testi-
mony.'84 In Christ v. International Business Machines Corp., 85 the
court admitted seven prior incidents of alleged switchover
shock, primarily through the testimony of the plaintiffs ex-
pert.' -86 The defendants argued in post-trial motions that the ev-
idence presented as to the seven incidents failed to conform to
the plaintiffs offer of proof made at the beginning of trial.187
The trial court found that the defendants had waived the issue
because they had failed to timely object to the evidence. 188
180 Sachs, supra note 1, at 272; see discussion supra note 64 (discussing whether
other incident evidence may be admitted to impeach an expert without first prov-
ing substantial similarity).
181 621 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
182 Id. at 301.
183 Id.
184 See Walker v. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmBH, 844 F.2d 237, 245 n.3
(5th Cir. 1988).
185 20 Phila. Co. Rptr. 610, 627 (Pa. Com. P1. 1984).
186 Id. at 626.
187 Id.
188 Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards, 971 So. 2d 854, 860 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007) (reversing judgment against manufacturer where plaintiffs and
their experts repeatedly referred to other incidents in direct and cross-examina-
tion without showing substantial similarity).
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